Defensive Realism in Iranian Foreign Policy, a Study of the 12-Day War

Document Type : Original Article

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1 ndu

2 دفاع ملی

10.22080/jpir.2026.30710.1512

Abstract

the Israeli regime directly attacked Iranian soil, targeting senior military commanders, nuclear scientists, and defense infrastructure. The initial success of this operation led Israel to conclude that Iran's deterrence and defense cohesion had collapsed, paving the way for weakening the regime's legitimacy and even overthrowing it; hence, in the early days of the Twelve-Day War, it spoke of "Iran's complete surrender." However, by relying on the logic of defensive realism and intelligently avoiding escalating tensions, the Islamic Republic of Iran was able to demonstrate its deterrence capacity and crisis management capabilities, ultimately forcing the Western side to propose negotiations and peace. This study uses a descriptive-analytical method to assess the compatibility of the theory of defensive realism with Iran's foreign policy behavior during the Twelve-Day War. The main question is how can the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran be analyzed based on the logic of defensive realism during the Twelve-Day War? The research hypothesis states that Iran attempted to respond to the Israeli attack in a managed framework to prevent the escalation of the crisis, rebuild the foundations of its deterrence and prove it to the attacker. Variables such as the security dilemma, defense policy, elite perception, and structural factors (offensive-defensive balance) can be analyzed within this theoretical framework.

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