Document Type : Original Article

Author

Lecture

10.22080/jpir.2022.21242.1209

Abstract

Since September 2015 and the Russian military intervention in the country, the interests in Syria have been numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. Russia, like the Allies and opponents of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, is fighting for geopolitical, geo-economic, or ideological reasons. The Middle East region finds itself shaken by the sharp resurgence of a confrontation between actors allied to the United States, other allies of Russia, and this Syrian crisis thus impacts the geopolitical configuration of the region. This paper presents an analysis of the Russian intervention strategy in Syria. The question is, why did Russia intervene in the Syrian civil war? The hypothesis is that Russia intervened in Syria to strengthen the already existing Russian-Syrian alliance, curb extremist proliferation, and take advantage of Syria's strategic position. The objective is to determine the reasons for the Russian military intervention in Syria related to energy and geo-economic interests. The Russian intervention in Syria was an ideal opportunity to draw closer to several powerful states in the region and a way to benefit from positive spin-offs on its arms market and hydrocarbon road plans. Despite the risks and costs associated with defending the Syrian regime, Moscow has secured its political and economic power in the Middle East. This research is based on a qualitative research method using data collection and analysis tools.

Keywords

AlAlkim, H. (2021) “U.S. President Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy towards the Gulf”. Open Journal of Political Science, 11, 378-401. doi: 10.4236/ojps.2021.113026. Andersson, Magnus Seland & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2021), “The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction” Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). PRIO PAPER 2021. Baev PK (2018) “Russia as Opportunist of Spoiler in the Middle East?” The International Spectator 50 (2): 8–21. Coface (2021). “Risk Assessment.The SyrianArab Republic”, Economic Studies.Available: https://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks/SyrianArabRepublic. Cordesman, A. H. (2017). “If the Fighting Ever Stops: Stabilization, Recovery, and Development in Syria”. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). DePetris, D. (2028). “The Dangers of Military Mission Creep in Syria”. The National Interest, 20th December 2018. Available in: Available at: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/dangers-military-mission-creep-syria-39412. Duclos, M (2019), “Russia and Iran in Syria—a Random Partnership oran Enduring Alliance?” tlanticcouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/Russia_and_Iran_in_Syria_a_Random_Partnership_or_an_Enduring_Alliance.pdfDaher, J. 2018, September. Three Years Later: The Evolution of Russia‟s Military Intervention in Syria”. Atlantic Council. Enes. (2018).” TheEnergyPoliciesofEU, Russia, TurkeyandSyria”. InternationalJournalofCommere and Finance,4(1), pp.96-106. Friedman, U. (2018). “Syria's War Has Never Been More International”. Retrieved October 14,2019, from The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/syria-civilwar-next/553232/. Freire MR and Heller R (2018) “Russia’s Power Politics in Ukraine and Syria: Status-Seeking between Identity, Opportunity and Costs”. Europe-Asia Studies 70 (8): 1185–1212. Grinstead, Nick (2019) ‘Makhlouf no more? Russia is calling in the debts in Syria’. OpenDemocracy, 6 September. Available at: www.opendemocracy.net/en/ north-africa-west-asia/makhlouf-no-morerussia-calling-debts-syria. Dogac Ipek, Cemil &Guler, Mehmet Cagatay (2021). “Turkey and Russia in Syrian war: Hostile friendship”, Security &Difence Quarlerly, vol. 35, http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/138949. Henderson, S. (2013, December). “Russia-Syria Offshore Gas Deal Injects NewFactor into Peace Talks”. The Washington Institute. Hetou, G. (2019). The Syrian Conflict. The Role of Russia, Iran and the US in aGlobal Crisis. London: Routledge India. Hinnebush, R. (2020). “The Battle over Syria‟s Reconstruction”. Global Policy, Volume 11(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12779. Igor, D. (2018). "Russie – pétromonarchies du Golfe: De la tempête à l‟accalmie". Confluences Méditerranée, 104(1), pp. 61-71. doi: 10.3917/come.104.0061. Irkhin, Aleksandr, Moskalenko, Olga (2019). “Russia’s Foreign Policy in the Greater Mediterranean: Prospects and Constraints”, Geopolitics Quarterly, http://journal.iag.ir/article_93709.html. Kabalan, M. (2018). “The Gulf Crisis: The U.S. Factor’. Insight Turkey, 20(2), pp. 33-49. doi: 10.25253/99.2018202.03 Karasik, T. (2017, March). “Why Qatar is Investing so much in Russia?” Middle EastInstitute. Khlebnikov, A. (2020). “Russia and Syrian Military Reform: Challenges andOpportunities’. Carnegie Middle East Center. Kozhanov, N.A. (2017). "Russian-Iranian Relations through the Prism of the SyrianCrisis". Insight Turkey, 19(4), pp. 105-124. doi: 10.25253/99.2017194.07. Laub, Z. (2019, October 23). Syria's Civil War: The Descent into Horror. Retrieved October 28, 2019, fromCouncil on Foreign Relations: https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war Lemke, D. (2002). Regions of war and peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Machnikowski, R. (2015). ‘Russian Manoeuvres in the Dark”. The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 24(4), 27-II. Mikovic, N. (2022), “Why Russia turns a blind eye when Israel bombs Syria”, Available at: https://asiatimes.com/2022/01/why-russia-turns-a-blind-eye-when-israel-bombs-syria/ Mocilnikar, A. (2018, Février). L‟Europe, la Méditerranée et l‟énergie. Annales DesMines – Réalités Industrielles, pp. 16-23. Nimmo, K. (2019, March). “Syria ready for War to Regain Oil-Rich Golan Heights?” Centre for Research on Globalisation. Global Research. Notte, H. (2016). ‘Russia in Chechnya and Syria: Pursuit of Strategic Goals’. MiddleEast Policy, 23(1), pp. 59-74. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12174. Organski, A. (1968). World Politics (2nd ed.). New York: Borzoi Books. Odeyemi, C. (2016). “Re-emerging Powers and the Impasse in the UNSC over R2P Intervention in Syria”. Strategic Analysis. Vol. 40(2). Pp. 122-149. Paraschos, P. E. (2013). “Offshore Energy in the Levant Basin: Leaders, Laggards, and Spoilers”. Mediterranean Quarterly, 24(1), pp. 38-56. doi: 10.1215/10474552-2018997. Paul, T. (2004). Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance.In T. Paul, J. J. Wirtz, F. Michel, T. Paul, J. J. Wirtz, & M. Fortmann (Eds.), Balance of Power (p. 5). Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pichon, F. (2018). ‘Enjeux et acteurs de la reconstruction en Syrie”. Les Cahiers del'Orient, 131(3), pp. 153-162. doi: 10.3917/lcdlo.131.0153. Pollock, D(2020) “Iran in Syria: Causes, Consequences, And Cures”. Arab Scholarship and Expertise for Peace and stability in the Middle East. 30th July 2020. Available in: https://mesbar.org/iran-in-syria-causes-consequences-and-cures/ Prontera, A., Ruszel, M. (2017). “Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean”. Middle East Policy, 24(3), pp. 145-162. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12296. Rauch, C. (2018). “Realism and Power Transition Theory: Different Branches of the Power Tree”. Retrieved October 16, 2019, from E-International Relations: https://www.eir.info/2018/02/03/realism-and-power-transition-theory-different-branches-of-the-power-tree/. Reuters (2019) “Syria Hands Oil Exploration Contracts to Two Russian Firms”. Reuters, 17 December. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-oil-russia/syria-hands-oil-exploration-contracts-to-two-russian-firms-idUSKBN1YL0VK (accessed 15 June 2020). Charap, S, Treyger, E, Geist, E. (2019) “Understanding Russia's Intervention in Syria”. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3180.html. Schaffner (2021) ‘Five Years After Russia Declared Victory in Syria: What Has Been Won?’ https://russiamatters.org/analysis/five-years-after-russia-declared-victory-syria-what-has-been-won. Sogoloff, N. (2017, August). Russia‟s Energy Goals in Syria. The WashingtonInstitute. Souleimanov, E.A. and Dzutsatti, V. (2018). Russia‟s Syria War: A Strategic Trap? Middle East Policy, 25(2), pp. 42-50. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12341. Sommer, T & Kavalek, F. (2020), “Russian Encroachment in Arab Countries”, available at: https://newdirection.online/2018-publications-pdf/NDreportCZ-Kavalek.pdf Tammen, R. L., Kugler, J., & Lemke, D. (2017, October). Foundations of Power Transition Theory.doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.296. Oxford. (2020, January). Turkey: Russian missile purchase will diversify supply. Oxford Analytica – Daily Brief. Vera, M.S(2021). “The tightrope walks of Russian-Israeli relations”, Availableat: https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3256-the-tightrope-walk-of-russian-israeli-relations Wasser B (2019) “The Limits of Russian Strategy in the Middle East”. RAND Corporation Perspective,November.Availableat:https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE340/RAND_PE340.pdf.